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Abstract. Using 2001 NYSE system order data in the decimal pricing environment, we 
analyze how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while making 
participation decisions to the trades. We analyze the following options that are available 
to the specialist before he trades: don’t participate; participate at the quoted price; 
participate and improve the price. We find that the specialist uses information in the limit 
order book as summarized by the limit order book asymmetry. The specialist increases 
the probability that he participates to the trade when a market order arrives if he is able to 
step in front of the heavy side of the LOB. If the relative size of the market order, as 
described by the ratio of the market order size to the posted depth at the relevant side of 
the market, is high, the specialist chooses not to participate and let the market order trade 
with the limit order book. Consistent with the theoretical results in the previous literature, 
specialists trade more aggressively when the spread is large. We find that specialist 
trading strategies in stocks from different volume and price categories vary substantially. 
Finally, we also find significant inventory effects. The specialist trades more 
aggressively, if the trade with the incoming market order restores his inventory. 
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 1 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialists are responsible for making 
markets for the stocks assigned to them. Their primary obligation is to ensure that there 
exists a fair and orderly market in their stocks. They should be willing to trade when 
other traders are unwilling to trade and the bid-ask spread should not be too wide. Also 
the specialists should intervene to prevent large price jumps, i.e., they should create price 
continuity. The NYSE uses the average width of the quoted bid/ask spread, the average 
depth of the quotes, the number of large price jumps, and the average size of price 
reversals to evaluate specialists’ performances. The specialists’ also have “negative 
obligations” that restrict their trading. Specialists cannot trade for their own accounts if 
there exist public orders at the same price or better. Also they should not trade with limit 
orders in order not to take the liquidity available to public traders. 1 
In this paper, we investigate the following issues by analyzing the participation 
decisions of the specialists to trades on the NYSE. First, what affects the participation 
strategy of a specialist to trades over time in an individual stock? Specifically, does he 
trade according to his affirmative obligations? Does he use information from the Limit 
Order Book (LOB) to predict the future returns of the stocks? Does he manage his 
inventory by using trades as inventory theories suggest? What is his reaction to the 
possibility of informed trading? Does he increase his participation to the trades to smooth 
prices when prices are volatile or does he avoid trading to stay away from risks inherent 
in volatile markets? Second, how do specialists’ trading strategies vary across stocks? 
Specifically, what is the effect of volume on specialists’ decisions? Does the specialist 
trade aggressively or defensively as the price volatility increases across stocks? Is the 
                                                 
1
 See Harris (2003) p.494 for an extensive description of specialists’  roles and how they can act against the 
interests of the public investors on the NYSE. 
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relative tick size, as defined by the ratio of the minimum tick to stock price, important in 
trading strategy of the specialists?  
The answers to these questions are very important because NYSE specialists 
make markets for a huge trading volume. On the NYSE, the dollar value of average 
monthly trading volume that the specialists oversee was $968.18 billion and average 
specialist volume as percentage of the NYSE total volume was around 20% in 2004.2 
Therefore, the average dollar volume that the specialists traded for their own accounts per 
month can be approximated as $193.64 billion. Specialists take one side of this huge 
trading activity and there are potential conflict of interests between the specialists desire 
to make profits for themselves and their obligation to be fair to all public traders. There 
has been an important debate going on about the role of the specialists and whether their 
contributions are valuable in the overall trading activity. Recently, as a result of an 
investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission into floor trading 
practices, five largest specialist firms at the New York Stock Exchange were required to 
pay a combined $241.8 million to settle charges of improper trading.3  More recently, the 
New York Times reported that the United States attorney's office was investigating 
individual specialists for executing proprietary orders before customer orders, and getting 
involved in a trade that should be carried out automatically with no intervention.4  
                                                 
2
 See “Market Activity” in the NYSE fact book that can be found at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/. 
Generally, the specialist participation rate mentioned in the literature is the specialist volume as percent of 
NYSE 2x total volume which was approximately 10% in 2004. If one wants to calculate the total volume 
that the specialists traded for their own accounts, specialist volume as percent of NYSE total volume is the 
correct figure to use. 
3
 See for example, Wall Street Journal (October 16, 2003) “NYSE to Punish Five Specialists In Trading 
Inquiry”. 
4
 “A New Inquiry Into Big Board Specialists”, New York Times, February 7, 2005. Our paper does not 
address the issue of improper trading. 
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The NYSE claims that investors get the best available price most of the time in 
the specialist system. But many institutional investors prefer faster executions and believe 
that the human-based system for auctioning stocks does not allow this.5  To address these 
concerns, the NYSE is planning to allow investors to execute more stock orders 
automatically.6 
Despite the important role played by the NYSE specialists, one can find little or 
no analysis of their trading strategy. One reason for this lack of analysis in the previous 
literature is the lack of the data. To provide a meaningful analysis of specialist behavior, 
one needs detailed data about orders. Publicly available TAQ database contains 
information about volume and prices of individual transactions on the NYSE. However, 
this transaction data provides no information about specialist participation in individual 
trades. In addition to TAQ, the NYSE provided researchers with TORQ (Trades, Orders, 
Reports, and Quotes) database that contains transactions, quotes, order processing data, 
and audit trail data for a sample of 144 stocks for three months: November 1990 through 
January 1991.7 This database can be used to partition posted depth into the specialist’s 
contribution and the LOB’s contribution (which is necessary for our analysis). Since the 
specialist IDs are removed from the TORQ database, one should rely on algorithms 
similar to the one provided in Panchapagesan (2000) to infer the trades with the specialist 
participation.  
Considering the numerous changes in the trading system and procedures that 
occurred on the NYSE since 1991, TORQ database cannot provide much information 
                                                 
5
 See “Fidelity Urges NYSE to Revamp Trading Operation“, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2003. 
6
 See“NYSE's Automatic Transition”, Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2004 and the “Hybrid Market” 
information posted under http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/hm_booklet.pdf and 
http://www.nyse.com/productservices/nyseequities/1167694947683.html  on the NYSE website. 
7
 See Hasbrouck (1992) for a detailed description of TORQ database. 
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about the recent behavior of quotes and transactions.8 Because of the public order 
precedence rule, the specialist has to better the quotes in the LOB if he wants to trade. 
The trading strategy of the specialists changed considerably after the decimalization in 
the NYSE, because undercutting the LOB became less costly now. 9  
 When a market or marketable order arrives, the specialist faces the decision of 
choosing between the following strategies: i. Do not participate; ii. Participate at the 
quoted price; and iii. Participate and improve the price. Using 2001 NYSE system order 
data in the decimal pricing environment, we analyze how the specialist reacts to the 
changes in the market variables while choosing one of the three strategies above. To 
complete this analysis, it is important to determine the position of the specialist in the 
posted quotes, because this position is a constraint on specialist’s strategy. For example, 
if a market buy order of size 100 arrives and the posted ask depth of 200 is coming from 
the specialist only, the specialist has no option but to trade with this market buy order 
unless another trading interest appears at the same time that can be matched with this 
market buy. In our example, if we did not look at the position of the specialist in the 
posted ask, we would incorrectly think that the specialist took the contra side of this 
market buy strategically, reacting to changes in market variables, where in fact he did not 
have any choice other than trading with the market buy. Accordingly, for each trade, we 
determine the position of the specialist in the posted quotes and determine his feasible 
strategies that do not contradict his affirmative obligations. Analyzing trading decisions 
of the specialists allows us to see if their trades are consistent with their market making 
                                                 
8
 The most important change is the switch to decimal pricing. For a list of other rule changes since 1997, 
visit http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.nsf/AllPubRuleChanges?openview&count=500 . 
9
 See Coughenour and Harris (2003) and references therein. Also see Ready (1999). 
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obligations as described above, or if they take away liquidity from the market for their 
own profits.  
This work is related to a number of papers in the previous literature. Madhavan 
and Sofianos (1998) analyze specialist participation in the total transaction volume. 
Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that LOB is informative about future prices and 
specialists use this information. In this paper, we extend and complement their analysis in 
a number of ways. First, as described above, we take the position of the specialist in the 
posted quotes as given. So we are able to answer the question that “given his position in 
the posted quotes, i.e., given his participation strategy to the posted quotes, how does the 
specialist participate to the trades?”. Second, we analyze the trading strategies of the 
specialists in the decimal pricing environment. The decimalization had many effects on 
the market variables including the profits of the specialists.10 Therefore, our study also 
contributes to the previous literature by showing how the strategies of the specialists 
changed after the decimalization. 
Our results from analyzing individual stocks over time indicate that the primary 
variables that the specialist looks at are the “Excess Spread”, defined as spread minus 
minimum tick, and the “Relative Order Size”, defined as the ratio of the market order size 
to the posted depth at the relevant side of the market. As the excess spread increases, 
more room is available for the specialist to undercut the LOB, and he trades more 
aggressively. This aggressiveness can also be the result of the specialists market making 
obligations. Since an increase in the spread is an indication of a weak market, the 
specialist might simply be trading because he has an obligation to trade when no one else 
is willing to trade. When the size of the market order relative to the posted bid size 
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 See Coughenour and Harris (2003) and references therein. 
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increases, the specialist increases the probability that he lets the market order trade with 
the LOB to protect himself from the possibility of informed trading.  
The specialist increases the probability that he participates to the trade when a 
market order arrives if he is able to step in front of the heavy side of the LOB. In 
addition, the specialist uses information from the cumulative order imbalance since the 
last trade to update his beliefs about the true value of the stock. If the order imbalance, 
defined as cumulative buy volume minus sell volume during the last 15 minutes or 15 
trades increases (decreases), the specialist increases the probability that he undercuts the 
LOB when a market sell (buy) arrives. 
We also find significant inventory effects. The specialist trades more 
aggressively, if the trade with the incoming market order restores his inventory. 
The effects of other variables seem to be secondary. There is some evidence that 
when the size of the arriving market order is medium, the specialist decreases the 
probability of participating in the trade, which supports the finding of Barclay and 
Warner (1993) that informed traders prefer medium sized orders.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the determinants 
of the specialist trading strategy predicted by the previous literature and states the 
hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data. Empirical methodology is discussed in section 
3. Section 4 presents the results from our analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
1. Hypotheses 
1.1. The determinants of specialist participation to the trades over time 
 
As first analyzed by Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), the risk of carrying 
inventory induces a positive bid-ask spread. However, many previous studies (e.g. 
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Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Kavajecz and Odders-
White (2001)) find weak inventory effects. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) provide 
evidence that specialists manage their inventories through the timing and direction of 
their trades rather than adjusting bid and ask quotes. Therefore, we expect a risk averse 
specialist to increase (decrease) the probability of taking the contra side of a market buy 
(sell) order when he has a long inventory position and, inversely, to decrease (increase) 
the probability of taking the contra side of a market buy (sell) order when he has a short 
inventory position.  
 Seppi (1997) models the competition between limit order traders and a strategic 
specialist. He shows that when the bid-ask spread is greater than the minimum tick, the 
specialist undercuts the LOB for small trades. As the spread increases, there will be more 
price points that the specialist can use to undercut the LOB and make profits. Also, a 
wide spread might cause large jumps in the prices. Therefore, a large spread may induce 
the specialist to increase his participation because he has the market making obligation to 
maintain price continuity. Accordingly, we expect that the specialist increases the 
probability that he participates in a trade when the bid-ask spread is large. 
 Easley and O'Hara (1992) shows that time between trades can be correlated with 
the factors related to the value of the asset. In their model, the frequency of trades is 
positively correlated with the occurrence of an information event. If no trade occurs in 
some time interval, the market maker raises his probability that no information event has 
occurred. Accordingly, he moves his bid and ask quotes closer to the true value of the 
stock, which is between bid and ask prices, because the probability of trading with an 
informed trader is low. This implies that the spread will be smaller as the time between 
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trades increases.11 In the context of our model, we expect that as no-activity time 
increases, the specialist increases the probability that he participates to the next trade. 
The state of the LOB is an important factor considered by the specialist while 
determining his strategy to participate in the trades. During our sample period, the 
specialists were required to share the general information about the LOB with the floor 
brokers when asked.12 However, this information was not available to most traders in the 
market, so the specialist had considerable advantage in having access to the LOB. In 
Seppi (1997) model, limit order traders are the primary source of competition that the 
specialist faces. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) find that specialist uses information 
from the LOB in ways that favor him. They argue, for example, that an asymmetry in the 
LOB predicts the likely direction of future price changes.  
Specialists may also use quote-matching strategies.13 As described in Harris (2003), 
quote matching is a front-running strategy in which quote matchers try to trade in front of 
large patient traders. For example, when a quote matcher trades (buys) in front of a large 
buy limit order, and prices move against him, he limits his losses by trading with the 
standing buy limit order. When a specialist buys in a similar situation, and the prices 
move against him, he should not trade with the limit buy order (a negative obligation) but 
at least he does not need to be on the contra side of upcoming market sells until the 
liquidity on the buy side of the LOB is exhausted.  
                                                 
11
 For a similar result, see Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997). For evidence of transaction clustering, see 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) and Engle and Russell (1998). 
12
 Recently, the NYSE started selling real-time aggregate order book volume at each price point through its 
new system called the NYSE OpenBookTM. This reduces but not eliminates the advantage of the specialists 
because they still have the exclusive access to individual orders. For more information, visit 
http://www.nysedata.com/openbook/. For the effects of the NYSE OpenBookTM, see Boehmer, Saar and Yu 
(2005). 
13
 See Harris (2003), p.248 and p.502. 
 9 
If the specialist exploits the information in the LOB, we would expect that when the 
LOB is heavy on the buy (sell) side, he increases the probability that he participates to the 
trade when a market sell (buy) arrives. There are two reasons for this. One of them is 
quote matching as described above. The second one is having information about the 
direction of future price changes. On the other hand, if the specialist trades according to 
his affirmative obligations, he would increase the probability that he participates to the 
trade when a market buy (sell) arrives at times when the LOB is heavy on the buy (sell) 
side to maintain price continuity. The effect of LOB asymmetry on the specialist’s 
participation strategy to the trades is therefore an empirically open question.   
In Kyle (1985) model, the market maker revises his expectations about the value of 
the stock upwards (downwards) and increases (decreases) the stock price as result of buy 
(sell) orders which possibly includes orders coming from informed traders. Although 
there are no bid and ask prices in the Kyle model, the idea is that the market maker 
updates his belief of what the stock is worth and adjusts the price so as to minimize his 
loss to informed traders. Obviously, this updated belief about the value of the stock will 
be crucial for the specialist when he has to decide whether to take the contra side of a 
market order. We expect that, as the buy (sell) transaction volume since the last trade 
increases, the specialist increases (decreases) the probability that he participates when a 
market sell order arrives, and decreases (increases) the probability that he participates 
when a market buy order arrives. 
 Barclay and Warner (1993) shows that most of the cumulative stock-price change 
is due to medium-size trades providing evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category. Following Madhavan and 
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Sofianos (1998), we define a trade as medium if it is between 50th and 99th percentile in 
size. We expect that, the specialist decreases the probability of his participation if the size 
of the market order is medium. 
  Dupont (2000) shows that the market maker reduces depth when the volatility of 
the asset value is high. Intuitively, high volatility increases the risks associated with 
carrying inventory which will result in less specialist contribution to depth. On the other 
hand, Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) state that “Price continuity rules require specialists 
to trade to stabilize prices, suggesting that participation will be higher in stocks whose 
intraday return volatility is large.” In a cross sectional analysis of specialist participation, 
they find a positive relationship between their volatility variable and the specialist 
participation rate. Bondarenko and Sung (2003) theoretically show that when the price 
volatility is high, the optimal strategy of the specialist is to increase his participation even 
when he is not constrained by the rules imposed by the exchange. The effect of volatility 
on the specialist’s quoting decision is therefore an empirically open question.  
  Peterson and Sirri (2002) find that “marketable limit orders are used 
proportionally more often: i) for larger orders, ii) by non-individual investors, iii) when 
the order size exceeds quoted depth, iv) when quote imbalances exist, v) when the depth 
is relatively low, and vi) when spreads are narrow.” Therefore it is more difficult and less 
profitable to execute a marketable limit order for the specialist. We expect that, if the 
arriving order is a marketable limit order, the specialist decreases the probability that he 
chooses strategy 3, i.e., strategy of undercutting the LOB. 
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1.2. Cross-sectional determinants of specialist participation to posted quotes 
Previous theoretical literature shows that specialists’ services are more valuable for 
illiquid stocks. We expect that specialist percentage participation to trades should decline 
as the liquidity of the assigned stock increases. Trading volume and market capitalization 
can be used as proxies for liquidity. So there should be an inverse relationship between 
specialist’s participation and these proxies. 
As discussed in detail in the previous section, when volatility is high, the specialist 
might reduce depth because of the risks associated with carrying inventory, or he might 
increase depth to stabilize the prices. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) find a positive 
relationship between the volatility as measured by the standard deviation of the midquote 
to midquote transaction returns, and the specialist participation rate in a cross sectional 
analysis of specialist participation. The effect of volatility on the specialist’s participation 
decision to quotes is an empirically open question.  
 Seppi (1997) analyzes a model in which specialists face direct competition from 
public limit orders that have precedence under the NYSE rules. He shows that specialist’s 
profits are maximized as the tick size goes to zero. The reason is that as the tick size 
approaches to zero, it becomes less costly for the specialist to undercut the LOB. The tick 
size on the NYSE switched from eights to sixteenths on June 24, 1997 and to pennies for 
a number of stocks on August 28, 2000. Finally, on January 29, 2001, all NYSE stocks 
started being traded in pennies.14 This decrease effectively relaxed the public order 
precedence rule and increased the set of prices over which the specialist can choose to 
undercut the limit orders. As predicted by the Seppi model, Coughenour and Harris 
(2003) find empirically that participation rates and high frequency trading profits 
                                                 
14
 See the “trading” column in NYSE timeline at http://www.nyse.com/about/timeline/TimeLine.html. 
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increased for specialists making markets for low price stocks as a result of 
decimalization. In the context of our model, it is more costly for the specialist to undercut 
the LOB for low price stocks which implies that the specialist participation to the trades 
will be inversely related to the “Relative Tick” defined as the ratio of the minimum tick 
($0.01) to the stock price.  
2. Data 
Our data is from the NYSE System Order Database (SOD). Because of the volume of 
the data, it is necessary to select a sample of NYSE-listed securities. The original sample 
is selected as follows:  Initially, 50 most actively traded NYSE stocks during the 20 
trading days prior to January 29, 2001 are chosen. Also 25 stocks from each of four 
Volume-Price groups are randomly selected. To pick the 100-stock random sample, 
NYSE-listed securities are ranked on share trading volume and, separately, on average 
NYSE trade price during the 20 trading days prior to January 29, 2001. Each security is 
placed into one of four categories after comparing its share price to the median NYSE 
share price and its trading volume to the median NYSE volume. These groups (of 
unequal numbers of stocks) are a high-volume:high-price group, a high-volume:low-price 
group, a low-volume:high-price group, and, a low-volume:low-price group. Within each 
group, securities are arranged alphabetically (by symbol) and every Nth security is 
chosen, where N is chosen to select 25 securities from that group. Because two of the 50 
stocks with the highest trading volume also are randomly chosen as part of the high 
volume groups, the final sample has 148 securities for the period April 2nd, 2001 – June 
29th, 2001. 
 13 
NYSE’s System Order Database (SOD) gives detailed information on the entry and 
processing of orders. Order data include security, order type, a buy-sell indicator, order 
size, order date and time, limit price (if the order is a limit order), and the identity of the 
member firm submitting the order. Execution data include the trade’s date and time, the 
execution price, the number of shares executing, and cancellation information. Orders, 
executions and cancellations are time-stamped to the second. 
To determine the available strategies to the specialist when a market order arrives, 
we have to determine his position in the posted quotes. For example, as discussed in 
detail in Section 3.2.1 below, if the specialist represents all depth in the posted bid quote 
which is equal to 1000 shares, and if a market sell order of size less than 1000 arrives, the 
specialist has no choice but to take the other side of this trade (assuming that there does 
not exist a simultaneously arriving public order that could be matched with this market 
sell). 15 Since the posted quotes reflect trading interests of the limit order traders, floor 
brokers and the specialist, we need to estimate the LOB to separate the portion of the 
posted depth coming from the LOB. The LOBs are estimated by using the method 
described in Kavajecz (1999).  First, the limit order book at the beginning of the sample 
period is estimated by searching for all execution and cancellation records that refer to 
orders placed before the sample period. Second, initial and each limit order book after 
that is updated sequentially depending on the placed orders, executions and cancellations. 
The result is the estimate of the LOBs at each point in time. After the LOBs are 
estimated, if the posted bid (ask) price is the same as the best limit bid (ask) price, then 
the LOB bid (ask) depth is subtracted from the posted bid (ask) depth. The residual depth 
comes from the specialist’s trading interest and the orders left by the floor brokers with 
                                                 
15
 Our sample also contains marketable limit orders. 
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the specialist for the specialist to execute (passive floor broker participation). We call this 
residual as the “specialist’s participation to the posted quotes” and use it to determine the 
position of the specialist in the posted quotes.16 Sofianos and Werner (2000) estimate by 
using data from January 1997 to February 1997 that passive floor broker participation 
rate is 10.6% of buy plus sell volume of all purchases and sales. The remaining trade 
volume belongs to the specialist (10.8%), system orders (44.9%), and orders actively 
represented by the floor brokers (33.7%).  
To calculate the transaction volume used in our analysis, we use Lee and Ready 
(1991) method to classify transactions in the TAQ database of the NYSE as buyer- or 
seller-initiated. 
3. Empirical Methodology 
3.1.  Stock by Stock Analysis (Specialist participation over time) 
 When a market or marketable order arrives, the specialist faces the decision of 
choosing between the following strategies: 
1. Do not participate, 
2. Participate at the quoted price, 
3. Participate and improve the price.17 
 Not all of above strategies are available to the specialist for all incoming market 
orders. Availability of the above strategies depends on the position of the specialist in the 
posted quotes. As an example consider the following scenario: The posted bid size is 
1000 shares all of which comes from the LOB. Then, a market order to sell 500 shares 
                                                 
16
 Our dataset does not allow us to split out the passive floor broker participation. 
17
 In their analysis of specialist trading decisions, Harris and Panchapagesan (2003) add one more case 
which is to “stop the order”.  The percentage of stopped orders in our sample is around 0.01%. 
Accordingly, we exclude this choice from our analysis. 
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arrives. In this case, only the choices 1 and 3 are available to the specialist. The specialist 
cannot participate at the quoted price because of the public order precedence rule.  
[Insert Table 1.] 
Table 1 reports the percentage of each quote case for different volume and price 
categories of stocks. If a stock’s mean daily volume (price) is above the median of our 
sample, then it is in the high-volume (price) category, otherwise it is in the low-volume 
(price) category. We observe from the table that specialists quote more aggressively for 
low-volume stocks on the bid-side. Average percentage of bid quotes in which specialists 
undercut the LOB for low-volume (high-volume) stocks is 16.78 % (12.21 %). One 
reason might be that low-volume stocks have thin LOBs and they need more specialist 
participation. Another observation is that the specialists quote more aggressively for 
high-price stocks. A possible explanation consistent with the discussion in Section 1.2 is 
that as the relative tick size approaches zero, it becomes less costly for the specialist to 
undercut the LOB. 
 We determine the strategies for different cases as follows. Let’s partition the posted 
bid depth into two parts that come from the specialist and the LOB. 18 So posted bid depth 
equals SB + LB, where SB comes from the specialist, and LB comes from the LOB. Let MS 
denote the size of the incoming market sell. There exist three possible quote conditions 
according to the values that SB and LB take and for each quote condition there are two 
possible cases depending on the size of the incoming market sell order, MS.19 Therefore 
we have the following 6 cases for bid quotes (mirror image holds for the ask quotes). 
                                                 
18
 We only discuss the cases for the bid quotes, as the cases for the ask quotes are the mirror image. 
19
 Koksal (2007a) analyzes specialist’s decision of how much depth to add to the posted quotes in addition 
to the LOB. 
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Case 1. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS > LB; LOB provides all depth; Market sell size > bid 
depth. 
Case 2. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB; LOB provides all depth; Market sell size ≤ bid 
depth. 
Case 3. SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB; Mixed Case ; Market sell size > bid depth. 
Case 4. SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB; Mixed Case; Market sell size ≤ bid depth. 
Case 5. SB > 0; LB = 0; MS > LB; Specialist provides all depth; Market sell size > bid 
depth. 
Case 6. SB > 0; LB = 0; MS ≤ LB; Specialist provides all depth; Market sell size ≤ bid 
depth. 
 
Below, we discuss the strategies available to the specialist for each of the 6 cases. 
Case 1: SB = 0; LB > 0; MS > LB 
 If the size of the incoming market order is greater than the posted bid depth, i.e., if 
MS > LB, then all three strategies are available to the specialist. Specifically, he may let 
the market order trade with the LOB; he may participate at the quoted price since the size 
of the market order is greater than the posted bid depth; or he may participate and 
improve the price and trade with the market order alone. This quote case provides the 
specialist with the highest degree of freedom, because since the size of the market order 
is greater than the corresponding depth coming from the LOB, the specialist can 
implement his strategy by choosing strategy 2 or strategy 3.  
 In this paper, we only analyze the initial decision of the specialist when the market 
order arrives. For example, the specialist may choose to fill part of the market order by 
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participating and improving the price and he may let the remaining part filled by the 
LOB. We do not distinguish between filling the orders partially or completely.  
[Insert Table 2.] 
Case 2: SB = 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB 
 If the size of the incoming market order is less than or equal to the posted bid depth, 
i.e., if MS ≤ LB, then the specialist has the option to do nothing and let the market order 
trade with the LOB, or he can participate and improve the price. Hence, only the first and 
third strategies are available.  
Case 3: SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB 
 In this case, the specialist cannot choose strategy 1, i.e., the choice of “not 
participating”. He has to choose either strategy 2 and participate to the trade at the quoted 
price, or he can undercut the LOB and fill this order completely for his own account. 
Therefore, the available strategy set is {Strategy 2, Strategy 3}.  
Case 4: SB > 0; LB > 0;  MS ≤ LB 
 In this case, the specialist cannot participate at the quoted price because of the 
public order precedence rule; hence second strategy is not available to the specialist. The 
available strategy set is {Strategy 1, Strategy 3}.  
Case 5: SB > 0; LB = 0; MS > SB, 
 In this case the specialist has no choice but to trade with the market order. 
Therefore, we don’t analyze this case. 
Case 6: SB > 0; LB = 0; MS ≤ SB, 
 Similar to Case 5 above, the specialist does not have any strategies to choose. 
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 Table 2 lists all possible quote cases, and the available strategies of the specialist. In 
this table, SB and SA also include some orders left by the floor brokers with the specialist.  
 Given that a particular quote condition is SB = 0; LB > 0 or SB > 0; LB > 0, we use a 
multinominal logit framework to analyze Case 1, where all three strategies are available, 
and a logit framework to analyze the Cases 2, 3, and 4, where only two strategies are 
available.  
3.2. Explanatory variables for stock by stock analysis 
 We use a multinominal logit model for our time series analysis of the specialist 
participation to the trades. This model will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3 
below. To test the hypotheses formulated in the first section we use the following 
variables for the time series analysis.  
Excess Spread is the current quote spread minus the minimum tick in cents; 
Relative Order Size is the log ratio of the market buy (sell) order size to the posted ask 
(bid) depth; 
 
LOB Asymmetry is the total size of the sell limit orders minus the total size of the buy 
limit orders in the LOB multiplied by –1 if the incoming market order is a sell order;20 
 
Near LOB Asymmetry is the total sell limit orders minus total buy limit orders within 20 
cents of the best limit prices multiplied by –1 if the incoming market order is a sell order; 
 
Signed Cumulative Order Imbalance is the total buy volume minus sell volume in all 
exchanges during the last 15 minutes or 15 trades whichever is shorter multiplied by -1 if 
the incoming market order is a buy order;21 
 
Specialist’s Signed Inventory cumulative inventory of the specialist preceding the trade 
multiplied by -1 if the incoming market order is a sell order;22 
                                                 
20
 If the specialist use information from the LOB as Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) found, they will trade 
more aggressively when they can step in front of the heavy side of the book 
21
 We expect that the specialist will take the contra side of a market sell (buy) order more aggressively if 
the cumulative order imbalance preceding the trade is positive (negative), i.e., he updates his belief about 
the security value upwards (downwards) if the buy (sell) volume preceding the trade is greater than the sell 
(buy) volume.  To calculate the transaction volume used in our analysis, we use Lee and Ready (1991) 
method to classify transactions in the TAQ database of the NYSE as buyer- or seller-initiated. 
 19 
 
Medium Trade Dummy takes the value of 1 if the trade size is between 50th and 99th 
percentile and 0 otherwise; 
 
Order Type Dummy takes the value of 1 for the marketable limit orders and 0 otherwise. 
 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the transaction prices during the last ten minutes 
before the current quote; 
 
Trade idle time is the normalized time in seconds since the arrival of the last market 
order. 
 
3.3. Cross sectional analysis  
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression model to analyze how the 
participation of the specialists varies across stocks: 
iii
iiii
ageSpreadAvePercentVolatility
apLogMarketClTickRelyVolLogMeanDaiSpecPart
εββ
ββββ
+++
+++=
54
3210
 (1) 
where, for stock i, iSpecPart  is the percentage of the trades that the specialist participated 
(at the quote or by improving the price), ilyVolLogMeanDai  is the log of average daily 
volume, ilTickRe  is the minimum tick size (=$0.01) divided by the average stock price 
over the sample period, iapLogMarketC  is the log of shares outstanding times average 
stock price, iVolatility  is the average of the volatility variable from the time series 
analysis, iageSpreadAvePercent  is the average percentage quoted spread over the sample 
period and iε  is the error term.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22
 We assume that the inventory of the specialist is equal to zero at the beginning of the period and ignore 
overnight changes in the inventory. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) use this variable too. If the specialists 
manage inventory, they will trade more aggressively, i.e., increase the probability that they choose strategy 
2 or 3, if trading would restore their inventories. 
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4. Results 
4.1.  Stock by Stock analysis 
 As discussed in Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings (2007), the exogenous variables 
affect the probability of choosing base case strategy, but because of the multinominal 
logit estimation, this effect can’t be determined directly from the coefficients. In addition, 
occasionally, the signs of the coefficients of the non-base case variables can be different 
from the signs of their impact on the choices. To solve this problem, following Ellul, 
Holden, Jain and Jennings (2007), we calculate what they refer to as impulse sensitivities. 
“Impulse sensitivity” is defined as the change in the probability of an event caused by a 
one standard deviation increase in an explanatory variable. The benchmark probability of 
each event is calculated by using the estimated logistic function evaluated at the mean of 
each of the explanatory variables. The significance of an impulse sensitivity is calculated 
by the method described in Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings (2007). 
 In this paper, we don’t distinguish between the market sells and market buys. Hence 
all the discussion below applies to both market buys and sells, since the 6 different cases 
are mirror images of each other for market buys and sells.  
 Tables 3 through 6 report the results for each of the four quote cases. Panel A of 
these tables report the impulse sensitivity of the exogenous variables. We will discuss and 
interpret the mean impulse sensitivities. In all tables, the percentages of significant 
impulse sensitivities at the 5% level of significance range from 89.41% to 100%. 
 The percentage probability changes in a row in the impulse sensitivity tables allow 
us to determine how the net effect of a one standard deviation increase in an explanatory 
variable from its mean is distributed among the strategies available to the specialist. This 
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distribution allows us to determine the strategies that the specialist leans towards, by 
looking at the overall change in predicted probabilities.  It is important to note that these 
numbers are not levels, i.e., they are not overall probabilities of selecting the strategies. 
Case 1. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS > LB   or   SA = 0; LA > 0; MB > LA 
Table 3, Panel A reports the mean impulse sensitivities along with the percentage of 
impulse sensitivities that are significant at the 5% level for each stock. In this quote case, 
if the specialist wants to participate in a trade, he does not need to improve the price, 
because the size of the market order is large enough. The specialist will improve the price 
if the remaining size of the market order is not sufficient for the size he wants to trade.  
[Insert Table 3.] 
 Specialists can use the (possible) information in the buy (sell) transaction volume in 
two ways. For example, when there is a large buy (sell) transaction volume, this may 
indicate that the stock price will increase (decrease). Accordingly, first, the specialists 
can protect themselves by not participating in a trade when a large market buy (sell) order 
arrives. Second, they can be more aggressive in participating a trade when a market sell 
(buy) order arrives. The impulse sensitivities for Strategies 1, 2 and 3 are -1.43 %, 0.64 % 
and 0.80%, respectively, when the “Cumulative Order Imbalance” increases by one 
standard deviation. As a result of one standard deviation increase in the “Cumulative 
Order Imbalance”, the specialist increases the probability that he chooses strategy 3 
(participate and improve price) by 0.80 %, increases the probability of strategy 2 by 
0.64% and decreases the probability that he chooses the first strategy by 1.43%. 
Therefore, the specialist acts more aggressively to buy (sell) the stock, when he infers 
from “Cumulative Order Imbalance” that the stock price will increase (decrease). Hence, 
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consistent with the Kyle (1985) model, he updates his belief of what the stock is worth 
and adjusts the price so as to minimize his loss to informed traders. 
 The effect of a one standard deviation in “Excess Spread” is to increase the 
probability of choosing strategy 3 by 5.57% on average. Probability of choosing other 
strategies decreases. Consistent with prediction of Seppi (1997), when excess spread 
increases, the specialist has more room to undercut the LOB, and he acts aggressively 
when a market order arrives. As discussed before, this result is also consistent with 
market making obligations of the specialists that they should be ready to trade when 
nobody else is willing to do so. 
 In their analysis of specialist strategies, Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that 
the LOB is informative about future price changes and the specialist uses this 
information. One of the variables that they use as measure of informativeness of the LOB 
is the overall LOB asymmetry. If the specialist uses information from the LOB, he would 
try to step in front of the heavy side of the LOB, i.e. he would be more aggressive and 
increase the probability that he chooses strategy 3. A one standard deviation disturbance 
to the “LOB Asymmetry” variable causes the specialist to increase his probability of 
choosing strategy 3 (stepping in front of the heavy side of the LOB) on average by 
0.40%. Hence, the specialist uses the information in the LOB to predict future price 
changes but this effect seems small.  
 When the “Near LOB Asymmetry” increases by one standard deviation, the 
specialist interestingly increases the probability of strategy 2 by 0.56%. This is in contrast 
to the results for the overall LOB asymmetry. It seems that the specialists use information 
from the LOB by using the overall asymmetry, however, they are constrained by their 
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market making obligations and are not always able to step in front of the heavy side of 
the LOB.23 
 Our results provide some evidence along the lines of the findings of Barclay and 
Warner (1993) that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category. When 
the size of the market order is medium, the specialist decreases the probability of 
participating and increases the probability of choosing the most defensive strategy by 
1.25% 
 The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 for “Order Type Dummy” is -0.68%. The 
specialist decreases the probability of aggressive participation which is consistent with 
the implications of Peterson and Sirri (2002) analysis that it is more difficult and less 
profitable to execute marketable limit orders. 
  “Relative Order Size” is one of the most important variables for the specialist while 
deciding whether to participate to a trade. When the size of the arriving market sell (buy) 
order relative to the posted bid (ask) depth increases by one standard deviation, the 
specialist decreases his probability of participating to a trade  (i.e., choosing strategies 2 
or 3) by 7.14%. Hence, the specialist is less willing to participate to a relatively large 
order, possibly coming from an informed trader. 
 The total impulse sensitivity of choosing strategies 2 and 3 associated with the 
specialist’s inventory is 1.31%. Hence, the specialist becomes more aggressive in 
participating to a trade, if the trade would restore his inventory. This supports the results 
                                                 
23
 Koksal (2007a) shows that the asymmetry in the LOB close to the best limit prices is more informative in 
predicting the short term price changes. 
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in Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) that specialists selectively participate to trades to 
manage the inventory.24  
 As the time since the last trade increases, the specialist increases the probability of 
participating by 0.72%. This is consistent with finding of Easley and O'Hara (1992) that, 
if no trade occurs in some time interval, the market maker raises his probability that no 
information event has occurred. In our model, as no-activity time increases, the specialist 
increases the probability that he participates to the next trade.  
 Finally, as stock price volatility increases, the specialist decreases the probability of 
becoming more aggressive by 0.65% because the risks of carrying inventory is higher 
when the volatility of the stock increases. 
Case 2. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB   or   SA = 0; LA > 0; MB ≤ LA        
 In this case, the strategy of participating at the quoted price is not available because 
of the public order precedence rule. Therefore, the specialist must improve the price if he 
wants to trade. One implication is that, when the specialist wants to restore his inventory 
for example, he has to be more aggressive. The mean impulse sensitivities from the logit 
analysis are reported in Table 4 along with overall significance of impulse sensitivities at 
the 5% level. 
[Insert Table 4.] 
 Similar to the previous case, the specialist revises his belief about the stock value by 
using the “Cumulative Order Imbalance”. The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated 
with cumulative order imbalance is 2.80%. Therefore, if the buy (sell) volume relative to 
the sell (buy) volume has been higher, the specialist increases the probability of 
                                                 
24
 Koksal (2007a)provides some evidence that the specialists also use posted quotes to manage their 
inventories. 
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participating to a trade when a market sell (buy) order arrives, to minimize his losses and 
make profits. 
 The “Excess Spread” has the most significant impact on specialist’s choice of 
undercutting the LOB. The impulse sensitivity of Strategy 3 associated with excess 
spread is 10.01%. This number is almost twice as high as that of the same impulse 
sensitivity in the previous quote case. Since the size of, say, a market sell order is less 
than the corresponding bid size in the posted quotes coming from the LOB, when the 
specialist trades with this market sell, and the prices move against him, he does not need 
to be on the contra side of upcoming market sells until the liquidity on the buy side of the 
LOB is exhausted. This is a type of quote-matching strategy discussed in Section 1. On 
the other hand, the reason why the specialists are more aggressive when the spread is 
large might be the price smoothing obligation of the specialists. They may be improving 
the price to smooth the prices which otherwise would be more volatile because of the 
large spread. 
 The effect of an increase in the total asymmetry in the LOB is an increase in the 
probability of specialist being more aggressive. Since the LOB asymmetry may be 
informative for the future price movements as shown by Koksal (2007a), and Harris and 
Panchapagesan (2005), the specialist increases the probability of being more aggressive if 
he can step in front of the heavy side of the LOB. 
 Similar to the previous case, the specialist is less likely to take the contra side of a 
marketable limit order because since the price is fixed, it might be less profitable to trade 
with this order. 
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 The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated with specialist’s inventory is 0.44% 
indicating that the specialist increases the probability of participating to a trade that will 
restore his inventory. This effect seems to be small though. This results is consistent with 
the findings of Madhavan and Smidt (1993) who find that the specialist inventories 
exhibit slow mean reversion, with a half-life of seven and three-tenths days. 
 The impulse sensitivity of the strategy 3 associated with “Relative Order Size” is 
negative, i.e., as the relative size of the market order increases the specialist decreases the 
probability of being aggressive.  In the previous quote case, the size of the market order is 
greater than the posted depth coming from the LOB. Therefore, the size of the market 
order is relatively larger than the market order in this quote case. Accordingly, the 
specialist is more aggressive in not participating to a trade with the arriving market order 
in quote case 1 when compared to quote case2. 
Case 3: SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB   or   SA > 0; LA > 0; MB > LA    
 Table 5 reports the results for quote case 3. This case is similar to case 1 except, the 
specialist has some depth in the posted quotes now. The specialist’s positive depth in the 
posted bid (ask) quotes indicates that he is trying to increase (decrease) his holdings of 
the stocks. Accordingly, we can expect that, when compared to quote case 1, the 
specialist will be more aggressive in undercutting the LOB, while participating to trades 
with upcoming market orders. This conjecture is indeed correct. For example, the 
impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated with “Cumulative Order Imbalance” for quote 
case 3 is 1.69%, which is higher than the combined impulse sensitivities of strategies 2 
and 3 for the same variable in quote case 1. Similar finding is true for the impulse 
sensitivity of strategy 3 for the “Excess Spread”. The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 
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associated with the excess spread in quote case 3 is 22.19%, whereas the same number 
for quote case 1 is only 5.57%. 
[Insert Table 5.] 
 As the relative market order size increases by one standard deviation, the 
probability of choosing strategy 2 increases by 8.93%. This increase is similar to the 
previous quote cases, where the specialist increases the probability of not participating as 
a result of an increase in relative order size. In quote case 3, however, strategy 1 is not an 
available strategy; hence the specialist increases the probability of the most defensive 
strategy that he can choose, i.e., strategy 2. 
 The impulse sensitivities associated with the asymmetry in the LOB is consistent 
with the previous quote cases. The results suggest that the specialist has some tendency to 
increase the probability that he participates to a trade, if he can trade in front of the heavy 
side of the LOB.   
 The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 related to specialist’s inventory is 0.69%. As 
discussed above, in this quote case, the positive depth coming from the specialist in the 
posted quotes might be an indication that the specialist wants to trade. If this depth is 
related to inventory concerns, we would expect to see that the specialist would be more 
aggressive in taking the other side of the incoming market order, which is the case here. 
Case 4: SB > 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB   or   SA > 0; LA > 0; MB ≤ LA    
 Case 4 is very similar to Case 2, in that the strategies available to the specialist are 
same. Since the size of the arriving market order is less then the depth coming from the 
LOB, the positive depth that the specialist adds is not very relevant. If he would like to 
trade, he has to undercut the LOB. There is one difference, however, similar to the 
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difference between quote cases 1 and 3. The positive specialist depth in the quotes 
indicates that the specialist wants or needs to trade. To increase the probability that he 
trades, he adds some depth in the relevant side of the posted depth. Accordingly, we 
expect that the specialist will be more aggressive in participating to the trades in quote 
case 4, when compared to the quote case 2. The results reported in Table 6 are similar, 
however, suggesting that these two quote cases are similar to each other. 
[Insert Table 6.] 
4.1.1.Trading Volume Effects 
 There is considerable heterogeneity across stocks as reflected by distribution of 
estimated coefficients (not reported). Previous literature (e.g. Easley and et al. (1996)) 
finds that the specialists handle frequently traded stocks and infrequently traded stocks 
differently. The services of the specialists are mostly needed in thinly traded stocks. In 
their analysis of posted quote changes, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) find that there 
exist significant differences between high- and low-volume stocks.  
 To investigate the effect of volume on the strategy of the specialist, we divide the 
stocks in our sample into two volume categories based on average daily volume. If the 
average daily volume of a stock is greater than the median, it is considered a high-volume 
stock; otherwise it is a low-volume stock. The results are presented in Table 7. We report 
and discuss the impulse sensitivities only. 
[Insert Table 7.] 
 The impulse sensitivity of the strategy 1 associated with the “Cumulative Order 
Imbalance” is higher in absolute value for low volume stocks for all quote cases except 
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for quote case 3. The effect of this variable is higher for low volume stocks, possibly 
because order imbalance carries more information for illiquid stocks. 
 The effect of “Excess Spread” is higher for high volume stocks for quote cases 1 
and 3, where the size of the market order is greater than the LOB depth in the posted 
quotes, and higher for low volume stocks for quote cases 2 and 4, where the size of the 
market order is less than the LOB depth in the posted quotes. This result has two 
implications. First, the specialist has more information than anyone about an illiquid 
stock that he oversees, because infrequently traded stocks are not closely followed by 
investors. In addition, the depth coming from the LOB for illiquid stocks is generally 
low, resulting in higher frequency of undercutting the LOB by the specialists consistent 
with their market making obligations to maintain price continuity. 
 In all quote cases except for quote case 2, the impulse sensitivity of undercutting the 
LOB associated with the specialist’s inventory is higher for low volume stocks. 
Specialists increase the probability of undercutting the LOB more for low volume stocks 
if the trade would restore their inventories because inventory management is more 
difficult for illiquid stocks. Therefore, whenever they get the chance, they aggressively 
try to restore their inventory.  
4.1.2.Trading Price Effects 
 Trading price of a stock can be important for the specialists because for the same 
number of shares, they have to use more capital for high-price stocks. Also, relative tick 
size, as defined by the ratio of the tick size to stock price, is smaller for the high-price 
stocks making the public order precedence rule less binding. In their analysis of specialist 
profits and the tick size, Coughenour and Harris (2003) find that after the decimalization, 
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participation rates and high frequency trading profits increased for specialists handling 
low-price stocks. 
 To see if the strategies of the specialists depend on the price of the stocks, we divide 
the stocks into two price categories. If the mean price of a stock is greater than the 
median in our sample, it is in the high-price category; otherwise it is in the low-price 
category. Table 8 reports the mean impulse sensitivities according to the price categories. 
[Insert Table 8.] 
 The effect of inventory on choosing strategy 3 is generally higher for low-price 
stocks. This implies that the specialists might be concerned more about the dollar value 
of their inventories. Since they have to trade more for low-price stocks to restore their 
inventories in dollar terms, the impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 related to inventory is 
higher for low-price stocks. 
 A similar effect can be seen in the impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 related to 
“Cumulative Order Imbalance”. It is higher for low-price stocks for quote cases 2 and 4, 
because higher number of shares is required to implement a particular trading strategy. 
4.2. Cross Sectional Analysis 
 Coefficient of logarithm of mean daily volume is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Specialist participation to trades decreases as transaction volume increases. This 
might indicate either that specialist services are needed more for thinly traded, illiquid 
stocks or participating to the trades for low-volume stocks is more profitable. 
[Insert Table 9.] 
 Log of market capitalization has a positive significant coefficient. Therefore 
holding everything else like volume constant, the specialist participation is higher for 
larger firms. One explanation might be that better public information is available for 
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larger firms and the possibility of informed trading is lower. Hence it is more profitable 
for the specialist to participate in the trades for these stocks to collect the bid ask spread. 
 In addition, there is a positive relationship between the volatility of the stock and 
the average percentage specialist participation providing evidence that specialists 
increase their participation to smooth prices for volatile stocks. Finally, estimated 
coefficient of the “Percentage Quoted Spread” provides a related result. As the 
percentage spread increases, the specialist has more price points to choose from, and 
accordingly, his participation increases.   
4.3. Are the participation strategies of the specialists to the trades informative about 
future price changes? 
 By using the TORQ database, Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that the LOB 
is informative about the future price movements, and that specialists use this information 
while making trading decisions. During the period of TORQ database the tick size was 
equal to $1/8, and after decimalization the strategies of the specialists have changed 
considerably.25  
 We use a direct method to test if the specialist’s trades are informative about future 
price changes. Specifically, we estimate the following model by using OLS for each 
security i : 
titiiktiiikti SpPartRR ,,,,,, εββα +++= −+ 10  (2) 
where subscript t  denotes arrival time of the market order, ktiR +,  is the transaction price 
return in basis points over k  periods starting at time t , ktiR −,  is the transaction price 
return in basis points over k  periods ending at time t , tiSpPart ,  is a signed dummy 
                                                 
25
 See Coughenour and Harris (2003). 
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variable that is equal to 1, if the specialist chooses strategy 2 or 3 for case 1, and is equal 
to 1 if the specialist chooses strategy 3 for cases 2, 3 and 4, and zero otherwise, and it is 
multiplied by -1 if the incoming market order is a buy order and ti ,ε  is the random error 
term. The definition of tiSpPart ,  implies that, a positive estimated coefficient indicates a 
correct prediction of the future returns by the specialist. k  equals 5 minutes, 1 hour or 1 
day. The model captures the predictive power of the trades that the specialists have 
participated over different time horizons. We include the lagged return to model return 
mean reversion in short horizon transaction price returns documented in the previous 
literature. 
[Insert Table 10.] 
 Table 10 reports the results from estimating equation (2) for all quote cases. A 
positive coefficient of specialist participation to the trades indicates that the specialist 
predicts the future return correctly. General conclusion from Table 10 is that, as the time 
horizon increases, the success of the specialists in predicting the direction of future price 
movement decreases.26 Koksal (2007a) finds that the limit order book  asymmetry close 
to the best limit prices is more informative about the future returns and this 
informativeness decreases as the time horizon increases. Accordingly, since this is the  
information that the specialists use, their success rate decreases with the time horizon as 
well. Overall, the specialists are not very successful in predicting future returns. Panel B 
of Table 10 shows that, overall success of specialists in predicting future returns is 
around 20%. Some specialists, however, are more successful in predicting future returns 
                                                 
26
 Koksal (2007a) shows that the participation of specialists in the posted quotes has some predictive power 
over future stock returns, this power being stronger for short-term returns. 
 33 
than others. The results from individual regressions (not reported) show that there are 
some specialists who can predict the future returns correctly over all time horizons. 
5. Conclusion 
Using 2001 NYSE system order data in the decimal pricing environment, we analyze 
how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while making participation 
decisions to the trades. We analyze the following options that are available to the 
specialist before he trades: don’t participate; participate at the quoted price; participate 
and improve the price. We find that the specialist uses information in the limit order book 
as summarized by the limit order book asymmetry. The specialist is more likely to 
participate to a trade with an arriving market order, if he can step in front of the LOB. If 
the relative size of the market order, as described by the ratio of the market order size to 
the posted depth at the relevant side of the market, is high, the specialist chooses not to 
participate and let the market order trade with the limit order book. Consistent with the 
theoretical results in the previous literature, specialists trade more aggressively when the 
spread is large. We find that specialist trading strategies in stocks from different volume 
and price categories differ. Finally, there is evidence that the specialists trade selectively 
to manage their inventories. 
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Table 1. Percentage participation by the NYSE specialists to the posted quotes 
  
    
This table reports the percentage of bid side and ask side position of the specialists for the stocks in our 
sample according to volume and price categories. If mean daily volume (mean price) of a stock is higher than 
the median, then it is in "high" category, otherwise it is in "low" category. The three possible cases for the 
posted quotes are: LOB alone, LOB+Specialist, and Specialist alone. SA and SB denotes the depth contributed 
by the specialist to the posted bid and ask quotes, respectively. Similarly, LA and LB denotes the depth 
contributed by the LOB to the posted bid and ask quotes, respectively.  The numbers in the rows sum up to 
100% subject to rounding error.  
     
     
    
 
Volume Categories LOB Alone LOB+Specialist Specialist Alone  
Bid-Side of the posted quotes SB=0; LB>0 SB>0; LB>0 SB>0; LB=0  
High 68.89 18.91 12.21  
Low 72.40 10.82 16.78  
     
Ask-Side of the posted quotes SA=0; LA>0 SA>0; LA=0 SA>0; LA=0  
High 53.95 23.80 22.25  
Low 62.47 15.96 21.57  
     
     
Price Categories LOB Alone LOB+Specialist Specialist Alone  
Bid-Side of the posted quotes (SB=0; LB>0) (SB>0; LB>0) (SB>0; LB=0)  
High 68.28 18.34 13.39  
Low 70.89 19.95 9.17  
     
Ask-Side of the posted quotes SA=0; LA>0 SA>0; LA=0 SA>0; LA=0  
High 52.92 23.30 23.78  
Low 57.65 24.64 17.71  
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Table 2. Specialist's available choices for different cases. 
 
 
   
This table reports possible quote cases at the time a market sell (buy) order of size MS (MB) arrives to 
the specialist. SB and LB are the contributions to the posted depth from the specialist and limit order 
book, respectively (similar for posted ask). Possible strategies of the specialist are 1 (Do not 
participate), 2 (Participate at the quoted price), and 3 (Participate and improve the price) depending on 
the quote condition. 
    
  
Possible Decisions 
 
Posted Bid Depth Size = SB+LB 1. Do not participate.  
Posted Ask Depth Size = SA+LA 2. Participate at the quoted price.  
  
3. Participate and improve the price.  
    
Bid Side Quote Condition Case Size of the Incoming Market Sell (MS) Possible Decisions 
1 MS > LB 1,2,3 SB=0; LB>0 
2 MS ≤ LB 1,3 
3 MS > LB 2,3 SB>0; LB>0 
4 MS ≤ LB 1,3 
5 MS > SB No Decision SB>0; LB=0 6 MS ≤ SB No Decision 
    
Ask Side Quote Condition Case Size of the Incoming Market Buy (MB) Possible Decisions 
1 MB > LA 1,2,3 SA=0; LA>0 
2 MB ≤ LA 1,3 
3 MB > LA 2,3 SA>0; LA>0 
4 MB ≤ LA 1,3 
5 MB > SA No Decision SA>0; LA=0 
6 MB ≤ SA No Decision 
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Table 3. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for Quote Case 1 
       
In Panel A, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event caused 
by a one standard deviation shock to the explanatory variable. Available strategies of the specialist are as 
follows: 1 (Do not participate), 2 (Participate at the quoted price), and 3 (Participate and improve the price). 
Significance column in Panel A reports the percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of 
significance. Panel B reports the percentage of negative and positive significant coefficients. 
       
       
       
       
       
Panel A. Mean Impulse Sensitivites (%)   
   
    
   
  
3 Choices Available 
to the Specialist Significance (%) 
Exogoneous Variables Str1 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str2 Str3 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -1.43 0.64 0.80 98% 99% 98% 
Excess Spread -4.20 -1.32 5.57 100% 99% 99% 
Medium Trade Dummy 1.25 -0.96 -0.29 95% 96% 97% 
Trade Idle Time -0.72 0.64 0.08 94% 96% 96% 
Relative Order Size 7.12 -4.83 -2.31 100% 99% 99% 
LOB Asymmetry -0.42 0.02 0.40 98% 98% 98% 
Near LOB Asymmetry -0.57 0.56 0.00 97% 98% 96% 
Order Type Dummy -1.77 2.45 -0.68 98% 99% 97% 
Specialist's Inventory -1.31 0.66 0.66 98% 98% 97% 
Volatility 0.64 -0.35 -0.30 98% 97% 97% 
       
       
Panel B. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages 
  
 
      
 Str1 Str2 Str3 
Exogoneous Variables Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 83 17 45 55 11 89 
Excess Spread 90 10 67 33 1 99 
Medium Trade Dummy 28 72 69 31 70 30 
Trade Idle Time 78 22 26 74 39 61 
Relative Order Size 0 100 97 3 100 0 
LOB Asymmetry 56 44 48 52 41 59 
Near LOB Asymmetry 58 42 41 59 54 46 
Order Type Dummy 71 29 16 84 87 13 
Specialist's Inventory 72 28 31 69 34 66 
Volatility 31 69 68 32 63 37 
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Table 4. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for Quote Case 2 
     
In Panel A, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an 
event caused by a one standard deviation shock to the explanatory variable. Available strategies 
of the specialist are as follows: 1 (Do not participate), and 3 (Participate and improve the price). 
Significance column in Panel A reports the percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% 
level of significance. Panel B reports the percentage of negative and positive significant 
coefficients. 
     
     
     
     
     
Panel A. Mean Impulse Sensitivites (%) 
  
   
  
  
2 Choices Available 
to the Specialist Significance ( 5 % ) 
Exogoneous Variables Str1 Str3 Str1 Str3 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -2.80 2.80 97.32% 97.32% 
Excess Spread -10.01 10.01 100.00% 100.00% 
Medium Trade Dummy 0.64 -0.64 95.54% 95.54% 
Trade Idle Time -1.03 1.03 94.64% 94.64% 
Relative Order Size 2.15 -2.15 98.21% 98.21% 
LOB Asymmetry -1.03 1.03 98.21% 98.21% 
Near LOB Asymmetry 0.23 -0.23 100.00% 100.00% 
Order Type Dummy 0.97 -0.97 96.43% 96.43% 
Specialist's Inventory -0.44 0.44 98.21% 98.21% 
Volatility 0.50 -0.50 99.11% 99.11% 
     
 
    
Panel B. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages 
 
 
    
 Str1 Str3 
Exogoneous Variables Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 86.61 13.39 13.39 86.61 
Excess Spread 99.95 0.05 5.36 94.64 
Medium Trade Dummy 54.46 45.54 45.54 54.46 
Trade Idle Time 89.29 10.71 61.61 38.39 
Relative Order Size 10.71 89.29 89.29 10.71 
LOB Asymmetry 60.71 39.29 39.29 60.71 
Near LOB Asymmetry 38.39 61.61 61.61 38.39 
Order Type Dummy 14.29 85.71 85.71 14.29 
Specialist's Inventory 62.50 37.50 37.50 62.50 
Volatility 32.14 67.86 67.86 32.14 
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Table 5. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for Quote Case 3 
      
In Panel A, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event 
caused by a one standard deviation shock to the explanatory variable. Available strategies of the 
specialist are as follows: 2 (Participate at the quoted price), and 3 (Participate and improve the price). 
Significance column in Panel A reports the percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of 
significance. Panel B reports the percentage of negative and positive significant coefficients. 
      
      
      
      
      
Panel A. Mean Impulse Sensitivites (%) 
   
   
   
  
2 Choices Available 
to the Specialist Significance ( 5 % )  
Exogoneous Variables Str2 Str3 Str2 Str3 
 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -1.69 1.69 91.76% 91.76%  
Excess Spread -22.19 22.19 98.82% 98.82%  
Medium Trade Dummy -1.86 1.86 97.65% 97.65%  
Trade Idle Time -0.16 0.16 94.12% 94.12%  
Relative Order Size 8.93 -8.93 97.65% 97.65%  
LOB Asymmetry -1.43 1.43 95.29% 95.29%  
Near LOB Asymmetry 1.17 -1.17 91.76% 91.76%  
Order Type Dummy 2.73 -2.73 89.41% 89.41%  
Specialist's Inventory -0.69 0.69 96.47% 96.47%  
Volatility 1.40 -1.40 96.47% 96.47%  
      
      
Panel B. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages 
  
 
     
 Str2 Str3 
 
Exogoneous Variables Negative Positive Negative Positive 
 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 69.41 30.59 30.59 69.41 
 
Excess Spread 100 0 0 100 
 
Medium Trade Dummy 61.18 38.82 38.82 61.18 
 
Trade Idle Time 49.41 50.59 50.59 49.41 
 
Relative Order Size 1.18 98.82 98.82 1.18 
 
LOB Asymmetry 55.29 44.71 44.71 55.29 
 
Near LOB Asymmetry 42.35 57.65 57.65 42.35 
 
Order Type Dummy 18.82 81.18 81.18 18.82 
 
Specialist's Inventory 57.65 42.35 42.35 57.65 
 
Volatility 37.65 62.35 62.35 37.65 
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Table 6. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for Quote Case 4  
      
In Panel A, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event 
caused by a one standard deviation shock to the explanatory variable. Available strategies of the specialist are 
as follows: 1 (Do not participate), and 3 (Participate and improve the price). Significance column in Panel A 
reports the percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of significance. Panel B reports the 
percentage of negative and positive significant coefficients. 
      
      
      
      
      
Panel A. Mean Impulse Sensitivites (%) 
   
   
   
  
2 Choices Available 
to the Specialist Significance ( 5 % )  
Exogoneous Variables Str1 Str3 Str1 Str3 
 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -1.11 1.11 96.70% 96.70%  
Excess Spread -5.37 5.37 97.80% 97.80%  
Medium Trade Dummy 0.37 -0.37 98.90% 98.90%  
Trade Idle Time -0.19 0.19 95.60% 95.60%  
Relative Order Size -2.54 2.54 93.41% 93.41%  
LOB Asymmetry 0.90 -0.90 93.41% 93.41%  
Near LOB Asymmetry -0.84 0.84 94.51% 94.51%  
Order Type Dummy 0.73 -0.73 95.60% 95.60%  
Specialist's Inventory -0.51 0.51 97.80% 97.80%  
Volatility 1.74 -1.74 95.60% 95.60%  
      
      
Panel B. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages 
  
 
     
 Str1 Str3 
 
Exogoneous Variables Negative Positive Negative Positive 
 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 81.32 18.68 18.68 81.32 
 
Excess Spread 96.70 3.30 3.30 96.70 
 
Medium Trade Dummy 50.55 49.45 49.45 50.55 
 
Trade Idle Time 76.92 23.08 23.08 76.92 
 
Relative Order Size 75.82 24.18 24.18 75.82 
 
LOB Asymmetry 36.26 63.74 63.74 36.26 
 
Near LOB Asymmetry 49.45 50.55 50.55 49.45 
 
Order Type Dummy 19.78 80.22 80.22 19.78 
 
Specialist's Inventory 42.86 57.14 57.14 42.86 
 
Volatility 26.37 73.63 73.63 26.37 
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Table 7. Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation according to volume categories 
    
       
This table reports report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event caused 
by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable from logistic regressions that converged for all quote 
cases by volume categories. If mean daily volume of a stock is above the median, then it is in the high-volume 
category, otherwise it is in the low-volume category.  
           
           
  
Quote Case 1 Quote Case 2 Quote Case 3 Quote Case 4 
Variable 
Vol. 
Cat. Str1 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3 
H -1.12 0.32 0.81 -2.27 2.27 -2.57 2.57 -0.68 0.68 Cumulative Order 
Imbalance L -2.25 1.50 0.78 -3.80 3.80 3.20 -3.20 -2.74 2.74 
H -3.46 -2.57 6.03 -7.17 7.17 -22.30 22.30 -4.39 4.39 Excess Spread 
L -6.21 2.08 4.29 -15.34 15.34 -21.59 21.59 -9.12 9.12 
H 0.79 -0.65 -0.14 -0.51 0.51 -0.78 0.78 0.09 -0.09 Medium Trade 
Dummy L 2.49 -1.79 -0.72 2.81 -2.81 -7.78 7.78 1.44 -1.44 
H 6.43 -4.04 -2.38 1.45 -1.45 8.61 -8.61 -1.27 1.27 Relative Order 
Size L 8.99 -6.95 -2.12 3.46 -3.46 10.72 -10.72 -7.37 7.37 
H -0.96 0.33 0.62 -0.27 0.27 -0.75 0.75 0.52 -0.52 LOB Asymmetry 
L 1.04 -0.81 -0.24 -2.45 2.45 -5.22 5.22 2.35 -2.35 
H -0.07 0.23 -0.16 -0.15 0.15 1.13 -1.13 -0.18 0.18 Near LOB 
Asymmetry L -1.91 1.47 0.46 0.92 -0.92 1.38 -1.38 -3.34 3.34 
H -0.91 0.66 0.25 -1.26 1.26 -0.32 0.32 -0.76 0.76 Trade Idle 
Time L -0.22 0.58 -0.38 -0.61 0.61 0.67 -0.67 1.97 -1.97 
H -1.21 2.08 -0.87 1.01 -1.01 2.60 -2.60 0.73 -0.73 Order Type 
Dummy L -3.29 3.44 -0.16 0.89 -0.89 3.43 -3.43 0.71 -0.71 
H -1.19 0.70 0.49 -0.50 0.50 -0.37 0.37 0.04 -0.04 Specialist's 
Inventory L -1.62 0.53 1.13 -0.33 0.33 -2.44 2.44 -2.57 2.57 
H 1.41 -0.94 -0.47 1.06 -1.06 1.35 -1.35 1.13 -1.13 Volatility 
L -1.42 1.24 0.19 -0.56 0.56 1.65 -1.65 4.06 -4.06 
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Table 8. Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation according to price categories 
    
       
This table reports report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event 
caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable from logistic regressions that 
converged for all quote cases by price categories. If mean daily price of a stock is above the median, then 
it is in the high-price category, otherwise it is in the low-price category.  
           
           
  
Quote Case 1 Quote Case 2 Quote Case 3 Quote Case 4 
Variable 
Price. 
Cat. Str1 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3 
H -1.67 0.77 0.90 -2.21 2.21 -1.92 1.92 -0.65 0.65 Cumulative Order 
Imbalance L -1.14 0.48 0.68 -3.49 3.49 -1.35 1.35 -1.79 1.79 
H -4.18 -2.72 6.90 -8.57 8.57 -21.61 21.61 -5.07 5.07 Excess Spread 
L -4.23 0.33 3.99 -11.67 11.67 -23.03 23.03 -5.82 5.82 
H 0.46 -0.44 -0.01 -0.29 0.29 -1.92 1.92 0.37 -0.37 Medium Trade 
Dummy L 2.18 -1.57 -0.62 1.72 -1.72 -1.76 1.76 0.38 -0.38 
H 6.29 -3.76 -2.53 1.58 -1.58 9.71 -9.71 -2.30 2.30 Relative Order 
Size L 8.09 -6.09 -2.05 2.81 -2.81 7.82 -7.82 -2.89 2.89 
H -0.71 0.39 0.32 -1.21 1.21 -1.00 1.00 0.68 -0.68 LOB Asymmetry 
L -0.07 -0.41 0.49 -0.83 0.83 -2.05 2.05 1.23 -1.23 
H -0.39 0.39 -0.01 0.68 -0.68 1.64 -1.64 -0.47 0.47 Near LOB 
Asymmetry L -0.77 0.76 0.01 -0.29 0.29 0.49 -0.49 -1.37 1.37 
H -0.90 0.72 0.18 -1.31 1.31 -0.92 0.92 -1.06 1.06 Trade Idle 
Time L -0.51 0.55 -0.04 -0.72 0.72 0.92 -0.92 1.08 -1.08 
H -1.50 2.36 -0.86 1.28 -1.28 2.32 -2.32 0.66 -0.66 Order Type 
Dummy L -2.10 2.56 -0.47 0.61 -0.61 3.31 -3.31 0.83 -0.83 
H -0.89 0.40 0.50 -0.78 0.78 -0.67 0.67 0.26 -0.26 Specialist's 
Inventory L -1.79 0.96 0.85 -0.05 0.05 -0.71 0.71 -1.63 1.63 
H 1.20 -0.65 -0.56 0.85 -0.85 2.05 -2.05 1.58 -1.58 Volatility 
L -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.46 -0.46 1.97 -1.97 
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Table 9. OLS Results from Cross-sectional Regression of Specialist Participation 
   
  
This table reports results from estimation of equation 1. Standard errors are reported in parantheses. 
***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Dependent 
variable is the percentage of trades that the specialist has chosen strategy 2 (participate at the 
quoted price) or strategy 3 (participate at the improved price). 
   
  
 
    
Exogoneous Variables Coefficients  
  
Intercept 0.344 ***   
 (0.118)    
Log Mean Daily Volume -0.062 ***   
 (0.016)    
Log Market Capitalization 0.043 ***   
 (0.014)    
Relative Tick 9.915    
 (9.105)    
Volatility (Std. Dev. of Transaction Prices) 0.005 *   
 (0.003)    
Average Percentage Quoted Spread 0.008 **   
  (0.004)     
     
Sample Size 120    
Adj R2 0.37     
 
 
Table 10. GMM Results from Time Series Regression of Future Returns      
                 
Panel A reports results from estimation of equation 2 for each of the 148 stocks in our sample. For each future return regression (k=5 
minutes, 1 hour, or 1 day), mean and standard error of all coefficient estimates across stocks are reported. The last two columns report the 
number of significant positive and negative coefficients at the 10% level. A positive coefficient of specialist participation to the trades 
indicates that the specialist predicts the future return correctly. Panel B reports the percentage of correct predictions for each quote case 
calculated by dividing the frequency of positive coefficients in Panel A by the total number of stocks used in the analysis. 
                 
Panel A. Distribution of the coefficient estimates            
 Quote Case 1 Quote Case 2 Quote Case 3 Quote Case 4 
 Mean 
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. Mean 
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. Mean 
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. Mean 
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. 
Variables k = 5 minutes k = 5 minutes k = 5 minutes k = 5 minutes 
Intercept 1.94 8.77 8 23 0.06 3.77 11 22 2.83 3.39 2 25 -1.54 5.28 18 10 
Lagged Return 0.04 0.39 18 29 0.07 0.13 13 40 0.09 0.35 18 18 0.29 1.58 19 17 
Specialist Participation 0.07 5.33 22 24 1.49 5.63 22 30 2.90 14.41 17 19 4.66 7.50 5 26 
                         
  k = 1 hour k = 1 hour k = 1 hour k = 1 hour 
Intercept 4.69 28.26 10 26 1.52 12.66 14 26 6.50 16.55 3 16 -3.73 26.27 10 10 
Lagged Return 0.08 0.82 22 17 0.03 0.35 29 21 -0.08 0.20 23 9 -0.01 0.25 14 13 
Specialist Participation 8.94 20.40 10 25 18.84 71.34 13 26 19.50 53.41 6 18 4.64 33.12 6 14 
                         
  k = 1 day k = 1 day k = 1 day k = 1 day 
Intercept 41.57 97.93 12 56 27.46 44.86 13 61 28.82 52.31 12 38 39.51 53.14 10 38 
Lagged Return -0.06 0.23 43 23 -0.07 0.17 55 23 -0.05 0.23 34 13 -0.05 0.24 34 13 
Specialist Participation 10.74 60.54 13 26 -6.97 38.53 27 26 12.91 98.26 14 10 -13.05 111.24 12 11 
                 
                 
Panel B. Percentage of correct predictions              
                 
k QC1 QC2 QC3 QC4             
5 minutes 18% 22% 19% 27%             
1 hour 19% 19% 18% 14%             
1 day 19% 19% 10% 11%             
 
 
 
